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Consciousness is a multifaceted concept; its different aspects vary across species, vigi-
lance states, or health conditions. While basal aspects of consciousness like perceptions
and emotions are present inmany states and species, higher-order aspects like reﬂective or
volitional capabilities seem to be most pronounced in awake humans. Here we assess the
experience of volition across different states of consciousness: 10 frequent lucid dreamers
rated different aspects of volition according to the Volitional Components Questionnaire
for phases of normal dreaming, lucid dreaming, and wakefulness. Overall, experienced
volition was comparable for lucid dreaming and wakefulness, and rated signiﬁcantly higher
for both states compared to non-lucid dreaming. However, three subscales showed
speciﬁc differences across states of consciousness: planning ability was most pronounced
during wakefulness, intention enactment most pronounced during lucid dreaming, and
self-determination most pronounced during both wakefulness and lucid dreaming. Our
data conﬁrm the multifaceted nature of consciousness: different higher-order aspects of
consciousness are differentially expressed across different conscious states.
Keywords: lucid, dreaming, sleep, volition, consciousness, metacognition
INTRODUCTION
The ability to engage in volitional behavior has traditionally been
closely associated with human consciousness: to freely act implies
to make conscious decisions (Dijksterhuis and Aarts, 2010). How-
ever, consciousness is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon; its
multiple facets differ across species, vigilance states, or health con-
ditions. A striking variation in consciousness is experienced every
day during the sleep–wake cycle: during wakefulness, human sub-
jects are normally alert, aware of external and internal stimuli,
able to reﬂect on their perceptions, emotions and thoughts, and
capable to volitionally act according to their intentions. While
most of these properties of waking consciousness fade during
the process of falling asleep, many basal features of conscious-
ness reappear during dreaming. Dream mentation may occur
in all sleep stages, but is most intense and vivid during rapid
eye movement (REM) sleep (Hobson et al., 2000). The dreamer
perceives and interacts with a hallucinated dream environment
and often experiences strong emotions (Hobson and Pace-Schott,
2002). However, typical dreaming is deﬁcient of many higher-
order aspects of consciousness: the dreaming subject experiences
highly impoverished self-reﬂective capabilities and therefore does
not recognize that he is dreaming. Instead of volitionally and sys-
tematically acting according to his intentions, the dreamer is a
rather passive subject in the chaotic ﬂow of the dream narrative.
In contrast, the rare state of lucid dreaming is characterized by
full-blown consciousness including all higher-order aspects: the
dreamer regains metacognitive abilities and memory, becomes
fully aware of his current state of consciousness, and experiences
volition and fully realized agency (Metzinger, 2003; Windt and
Metzinger, 2007). As phrased by Van Eeden (1913), who coined
the term lucid dreaming: “the sleeper remembers his day-life and
his own condition, reaches a state of perfect awareness, and is
able to direct his attention, and to attempt different acts of free
volition.”
On a closer look, however, the situation is less clear: on the
one hand, during alert wakefulness, the experience of volitional
capabilities may be strikingly impaired as seen, e.g., in patho-
logical cases such as delusions of alien control in schizophrenic
patients (Lafargue and Franck, 2009) or in alien hand syndrome
(Biran and Chatterjee, 2004). On the other hand, during altered
states of consciousness such as hypnosis (Oakley and Halligan,
2013) or even non-lucid REM sleep (Takahara et al., 2006), voli-
tional behavior can be observed. Moreover, lucid dreaming is
not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but might occur in differ-
ent degrees from pre-lucid reﬂections to full-blown lucid control
dreams (Tyson et al., 1984; Barrett, 1992; Kahan and LaBerge,
1994). Descriptions of higher-order aspects of consciousness
in lucid dreaming, including volitional capacities, rely mainly
on anecdotal evidence, but have rarely been studied systemat-
ically. Two recent exceptions are the Metacognitive, Affective,
Cognitive Experience questionnaire (MACE; Kahan and Sulli-
van, 2012) and the Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams scale
(LuCiD;Voss et al., 2013) which have been used to assess metacog-
nition during different states of consciousness including lucid
dreaming.
Here, we assessed different aspects of volition during nor-
mal dreaming, lucid dreaming, and wakefulness with an adapted
version of the Volitional Components Questionnaire (VCQ;
Kuhl and Fuhrmann, 1998) in lucid dreamers. We hypothesized
that experienced volition would be generally higher in both
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wakefulness and lucid dreaming compared to non-lucid dreaming.
We exploratively tested if the subscales of the VCQ would
differentially vary between the three states of consciousness.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ten healthy subjects (mean age 28.1 ± 9.8 years, age range 19–47
years, ﬁve female) recruited at the University of Munich or from
a volunteer database of the Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry
participated in this study. They allwere experienced luciddreamers
with a reportedmean frequencyof 1.9±0.7 luciddreamsperweek.
Lucid dreaming ability was veriﬁed in ﬁve of the subjects in a sleep
laboratory with full polysomnographic recordings, exploiting the
classical eye signaling technique (LaBerge et al., 1981). For the
other ﬁve subjects, lucid dreaming ability was assessed by self-
report.
To measure volition in different states of consciousness, we
adapted the German short version of the VCQ (Selbststeuerungs-
Inventar, SSI-K3; Kuhl and Alsleben, 2012). The VCQ is an
instrument to measure different aspects of volitional compe-
tence; it speciﬁcally aims at assessing the subjective experience of
volitional components supporting central coordination of goal-
maintenance and self-maintenance (Kuhl and Fuhrmann, 1998).
The short form includes 13 subscales consisting of four items each.
The test subjects have to rate the extent to which the item applies
to themselves on a four-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all)
to 4 (wholly). The validity of both the long and short versions
has been repeatedly demonstrated (Forstmeier and Rüddel, 2008).
Since several of the 13 subscales are not meaningfully applicable
to the dreaming state, as they, e.g., ask to evaluate time frames
of several weeks, we chose to restrict the study to six subscales:
self-determination, planning ability, intention enactment, powers of
concentration, self-access, and integration. As ameasure for the gen-
eral experience of volitional capacity, an overall score consisting
of the mean of all six subscales was calculated. Where necessary,
questions were adapted to be applicable to the dreaming state, e.g.,
the integration subfactor item “On many days I feel the opposite
of what I felt before” was changed to “I often feel the opposite of
what I felt before.” The sequential order of questions was adopted
from the original questionnaire.
Subjects were asked to complete the questionnaire at least
once for each of the three states of consciousness: in the morn-
ing after awakening from a non-lucid dream, in the morning
after awakening from a lucid dream, and after a normal day of
wakefulness, i.e., before going to bed in the evening. Speciﬁ-
cally, subjects were instructed to rate their general experience
during the respective state, using the preceding dream or day
as an anchor or reminder thereof. For those individuals who
completed the questionnaire more than once for one of the
three states of consciousness, we used the mean score of the
given state for further analysis. For wakefulness, four subjects
contributed multiple questionnaires adding up to a total of 15;
for non-lucid dreaming, ﬁve subjects contributed multiple ques-
tionnaires adding up to a total of 20; for lucid dreaming, four
subjects contributed multiple questionnaires adding up to a total
of 14.
For statistical analysis of the VCQ overall score, we performed
a repeated measures ANOVA with the three factor levels non-lucid
dreaming, lucid dreaming, and wakefulness. For speciﬁc compar-
isons between the three states of consciousness, we performed post
hoc two-sided paired t-tests. For statistical analysis of the six sub-
scales, we ﬁrst performed a repeated measures MANOVA with the
three factor levelsnon-lucid dreaming, lucid dreaming, andwakeful-
ness. For further analysis of the subscales that revealed signiﬁcant
results in the followingANOVAs, we subsequently performed two-
sided paired t-tests to analyze speciﬁc differences between the
states of consciousness. All signiﬁcance levels were set at p = 0.05.
RESULTS
The ANOVA for the VCQ overall score revealed a signiﬁcant effect
of the state of consciousness (F2,18 = 4.4, p = 0.027, η2 = 0.33).
Subsequent t-tests demonstrated that both wakefulness (t9 = 2.7,
p = 0.026, r = 0.66) and lucid dreaming (t9 = 2.3, p = 0.044,
r = 0.61) differed from non-lucid dreaming, however not from
each other (t = 0.5, p = 0.618, r = 0.17). Hence, volition was
strongly experienced during wakefulness and lucid dreaming, but
considerably less so during non-lucid dreaming. For comparisons
of the overall results, see Table 1.
The MANOVA for the subscales of the VCQ revealed a signiﬁ-
cant effect of the state of consciousness (F12,26 = 8.9, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.80), which turned out to be signiﬁcant for the subscales
self-determination (F2,18 = 15.4, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.63), plan-
ning ability (F2,18 = 31.2, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.78), and intention
enactment (F2,18 = 7.3, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.45), but not for pow-
ers of concentration (F2,18 = 0.1, p = 0.942, η2 = 0.01), self-access
(F2,18 = 0.6, p = 0.573, η2 = 0.06), or integration (F2,18 = 0.7,
p = 0.503, η2 = 0.07). Subsequent t-tests demonstrated that self-
determination was signiﬁcantly more pronounced during both
wakefulness (t9 = 5.6, p < 0.001, r = 0.88) and lucid dreaming
(t9 = 5.2, p < 0.001, r = 0.87) compared to non-lucid dream-
ing, however did not differ between the two former states of
consciousness (t9 = 0.9, p = 0.461, r = 0.28). Planning ability
was most pronounced during wakefulness compared to both lucid
(t9 = 6.5, p< 0.001, r = 0.91) and non-lucid dreaming (t9 = 5.7,
p < 0.001, r = 0.88), but did not differ between the latter two
states (t9 = 0.8, p = 0.407, r = 0.25). Intention enactment turned
Table 1 | Experienced volition during wakefulness, lucid dreaming and
non-lucid dreaming according to theVolitional Components
Questionnaire (VCQ) overall and subscale results.
Scale Wakefulness Lucid
dreaming
Non-lucid
dreaming
Overall 2.93 ± 0.11 2.85 ± 0.14 2.47 ± 0.13
Self-determination 3.10 ± 0.17 3.33 ± 0.14 2.21 ± 0.16
Planning ability 2.81 ± 0.19 1.40 ± 0.14 1.29 ± 0.13
Intention enactment 2.43 ± 0.20 3.43 ± 0.15 2.49 ± 0.25
Powers of concentration 2.65 ± 0.22 2.67 ± 0.34 2.76 ± 0.33
Self-access 3.35 ± 0.18 3.23 ± 0.28 3.03 ± 0.25
Integration 3.24 ± 0.18 3.06 ± 0.26 3.06 ± 0.21
Bold print indicates signiﬁcantly higher volition compared to non-bold printed data.
Data are given as mean scores ± SEM, for statistics see results section.
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out to be most pronounced during lucid dreaming compared to
both wakefulness (t9 = 3.9, p = 0.004, r = 0.79) and non-lucid
dreaming (t9 = 3.2, p = 0.011, r = 0.73), while the latter two states
did not differ from each other (t9 = 0.2, p = 0.862, r = 0.06). For
subscale comparisons, see Table 1.
DISCUSSION
Comparing the experience of volition as assessed by theVCQ dur-
ing three different states of consciousness, we found volition to
be generally most pronounced during both wakefulness and lucid
dreaming as compared to non-lucid dreaming. A more differen-
tial picture appeared when the subscales of theVCQ were analyzed
separately.
For both lucid dreaming and wakefulness, self-determination
was rated higher than for non-lucid dreaming. This subscale is
probably the most prototypical volitional component, asking to
what degree the subject experiences being able to act freely accord-
ing to his will. The fact that the result of this subscale is in line with
the overall score conﬁrms the hypothesis that volition is generally
more pronounced during both wakefulness and lucid dreaming
compared to non-lucid dreaming.
For wakefulness, planning ability was rated higher than for both
lucid and non-lucid dreaming. This subscale asks for how well
organized the subject pursues his plans and intentions. The fact
that this subfactor is most pronounced during wakefulness com-
pared to both dreaming states might be interpreted as a sign for a
more spontaneous execution of intentions during dreaming.
For lucid dreaming, intention enactment was rated higher than
for both wakefulness and non-lucid dreaming. This factor asks
for how promptly and determined intentions are executed. On
ﬁrst sight, this seems to be a surprising ﬁnding, demonstrat-
ing that a component of volition is more strongly experienced
during a state of sleep than during wakefulness. However, on
second sight a strong feeling of being able to enact one’s inten-
tions during lucid dreaming seems reasonable, as the dreamer is
aware that in contrast to the constraints of waking life, during
dreams all potential obstacles are not real and hence can easily
be overcome. This interpretation would also be in line with the
former ﬁnding of a comparably low level of experienced plan-
ning ability during lucid dreaming: organized planning might be
possible during lucid dreaming inprinciple, however is rarely actu-
ally performed since intention execution is possible without such
effort.
Neither powers of concentration, nor self-access, nor integration
differed between the three states of consciousness. The ﬁrst of
these subfactors asks for how easily the subject gets distracted
from his current line of intentional thought. The failure to
ﬁnd any difference between the three states of consciousness is
rather surprising, since concentration and goal-directed thinking
are generally thought to be strongly impaired during non-lucid
dreaming (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 2002; Metzinger, 2003). The
subfactor self-access asks for the quality of access to one’s inten-
tions and feelings in stressful situations. Itmight be speculated that
in such situations, also during wakefulness and lucid-dreaming,
self-reﬂection might be impaired, thereby leveling potential dif-
ferences of self-access that would occur in non-stressed situations.
The subfactor integration asks for the occurrence of seemingly
contradictory behaviors and emotions. It is rather surprising that
non-lucid dreaming does not differ from the other two states,
since incongruities and inconsistencies are generally associated
most strongly with the dreaming state (Mamelak and Hobson,
1989). However, such inconsistencies are typically attributed to
the dream plot rather than to the dreamer, whose mental complex-
ity is narrow and “single-minded” compared to a much broader
repertoire of behaviors and thoughts experienced during wakeful-
ness or lucid dreaming (Rechtschaffen, 1978). Hence, compared
to a bizarre and highly incongruent dream plot, the single-
mindedness of dream cognition might be experienced as relatively
straightforward.
In the following, we will try to embed the topic of volition in a
broader discussion of the multiple facets and neural correlates of
human consciousness.
BASAL VS. HIGHER-ORDER ASPECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The enquiry into consciousness has long been the domain of
philosophy, however recent years witnessed a growing interest
also among neuroscientists in the problems surrounding con-
sciousness. While there is still little agreement on a speciﬁc
characterization or deﬁnition, it seems clear that conscious-
ness is a multifaceted concept, with its different aspects varying
dramatically between species, vigilance states, or health con-
ditions. A common categorization differentiates between basal
and higher-order aspects of consciousness: the concept of basal
(or primary) consciousness comprises perceptions and emotions,
whereas higher-order (or secondary) consciousness is proposed to
constitute reﬂections on these (for a review cf. Morin, 2006). As
phrased by Edelman (2003, p. 5521): “Higher-order consciousness
allows its possessors to go beyond the limits of the remembered
present of primary consciousness. An individual’s past history,
future plans, and consciousness of being conscious all become
accessible.”
A striking variation in consciousness is experienced every day
during the sleep–wake cycle: awake human subjects are normally
alert, aware of external and internal stimuli, and able to reﬂect on
their perceptions and emotions and to volitionally act according
to their intentions. These experiences and capabilities fade during
the process of falling asleep, however the progress through the
sleep cycle is associated with a reinstatement of essential features
of consciousness: REM sleep evokes the most vivid and intense
dreams, in which the sleeper perceives a hallucinated environment
and often experiences strong emotions.
However, the dreaming state instantiates only basal aspects of
consciousness, being deﬁcient in reﬂective thought,metacognition
and volitional capabilities: the internally generated perceptions
and emotions experienced during dreaming typically show many
cognitive abnormalities, with a bizarre dream plot full of gaps,
delusional thought, and a complete lack of insight into the cur-
rent condition (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 2002; Metzinger, 2003).
Rechtschaffen (1978) called this persistence of a single train
of related thoughts and images without disruption from other
simultaneous thoughts or reﬂections the “single-mindedness” of
dreams. He pointed out that without reﬂectiveness, there could
hardly be volitional control. Nevertheless, some rudimentary pro-
cesses of reﬂection and volition have been reported to occur
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during dreaming (Kahan et al., 1997; Wolman and Kozmová,
2007), even though less often than for waking episodes (Kahan
et al., 1997; Voss et al., 2013). Our results conﬁrm these ﬁndings,
suggesting a generally weaker experience of volition during non-
lucid dreaming compared to wakefulness, however with some
components being similarly expressed during wakefulness and
dreaming.
LUCID DREAMING AS HIGHER-ORDER CONSCIOUSNESS
In contrast to the restricted consciousness of normal dream-
ing, the rare state of lucid dreaming is characterized by full-
blown consciousness including all higher-order aspects: the
sleeping subject is no longer deluded by the dream narra-
tive, but becomes fully aware of the true nature of his cur-
rent state of consciousness (LaBerge et al., 1981). This wake-
like intellectual clarity comprises a restored access to memory
functions including increased availability of self-related infor-
mation, and fully realized agency, enabling the dreamer to
volitionally execute his intentions within the dream narra-
tive (Metzinger, 2003; Windt and Metzinger, 2007). Lucid
dreaming can be trained (LaBerge, 1980; Purcell et al., 1986),
which makes this phenomenon a promising research topic
despite its rarity in untrained subjects (Schredl and Erlacher,
2011).
In comparing lucid and non-lucid REM sleep, the distinc-
tion between basal and higher-order consciousness is of great
value, since the contrast between lucid and non-lucid dream-
ing strikingly mirrors the conceptual contrast between basal and
higher-order consciousness (Dresler et al., 2009; Hobson, 2009):
while all basal features of consciousness like perceptions and
emotions are present in normal dreaming, metacognitive reﬂec-
tions and the insight into the current state of consciousness is
– by deﬁnition – bound to lucidity. Since also in non-lucid
dream reports some reﬂective thoughts have been reported and
since also during daydreaming and other phases of wakefulness
active reﬂections are frequently absent, it has been argued that
metacognitive activity differs only quantitatively and not qual-
itatively between dreaming and waking consciousness (Kahan
et al., 1997; Kahan and LaBerge, 2011). However, this absence
is only a “local,” not global feature of such phases: it is hardly
imaginable, at least for non-pathological cases, that the day-
dreaming subject misinterprets the daydream for reality once
paying attention to his current state. For the dreaming state, in
contrast, this is completely normal – unless the dreamer eventu-
ally achieves lucidity through these “prelucid” reﬂections (Tyson
et al., 1984).
Lucid dreaming may even be critical to fully understand-
ing the neural correlates of higher-order consciousness, because
in contrast to, e.g., coma–wake, anesthesia–wake, or sleep–
wake comparisons, there is no major shift in vigilance state as
deﬁned by formal neurophysiological criteria: lucid REM sleep
still is REM sleep proper according to the classical Rechtschaf-
fen and Kales (1968) or new AASM (Iber et al., 2007) sleep
scoring criteria. When compared to wakefulness, pathological
or pharmaceutically induced loss of consciousness also reduces
the brain’s basal metabolism, as does deep sleep. Dreaming
therefore provides the only phenomenon we know of, that can
contrast basal consciousness with full-blown higher-order con-
sciousness within the same vigilance level (Spoormaker et al.,
2010), allowing for comparison of cerebral activity by means
of EEG, PET, or fMRI without differences in the basal activity
state.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF LUCID DREAMING
On the phenomenological level, REM sleep is the sleep stage asso-
ciated with the most vivid sleep mentation (Fosse et al., 2001).
On the neurobiological level, it is associated with strong activa-
tion of visual association areas and limbic structures such as the
amygdala, while the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and
parietal areas are deactivated (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al.,
1998). This activation pattern has been proposed to underlie the
visual hallucinations, emotional intensiﬁcations, and metacog-
nitive impairments experienced in most dreams (Hobson and
Pace-Schott, 2002; Schwartz and Maquet, 2002). In particular
diminished activity in the DLPFC during REM sleep has been
related to cognitive aspects of dreaming such as impaired directed
thought, volitional control, and a complete lack of insight into the
current state of consciousness (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 2002;
Schwartz and Maquet, 2002).
In contrast to normal dreaming, the regaining of wake-like
metacognitive capabilities during lucid dreaming is related to
increased EEG gamma-band activity over dorsolateral prefrontal
areas (Voss et al., 2009). fMRI data have conﬁrmed increased acti-
vation of the DLPFC during lucid dreaming, as well as of bilateral
frontopolar and parietal areas (Dresler et al., 2012). These brain
regions have been related to self-focused metacognitive evalua-
tion (Stuss et al., 2001; Schmitz et al., 2004), supervisory modes
(Burgess et al., 2007), and self-referential processing in general
including the experience of agency (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006).
Their activation during lucid dreaming is in line with the notion
that lucidity consists in an increased availability of self-related
information, leading to amuchhigher degree of coherence and sta-
bility of the phenomenal self during lucid dreaming (Metzinger,
2003). Our ﬁndings ﬁt well into this literature, demonstrating
that volition is similarly experienced during wakefulness and lucid
dreaming as compared to non-lucid dreaming.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF VOLITION
As is the case for consciousness, volition is a multifaceted concept,
hence not traceable to one speciﬁc brain region. However, sev-
eral cortical areas have repeatedly been demonstrated to be related
to volitional processes. While most studies show motor areas to
be involved in volitional action, this research mainly focuses on
willed motor actions (Haggard, 2008), which seem to share simi-
lar neural substrates during wakefulness and dreaming (Erlacher
and Schredl, 2008; Dresler et al., 2011). In contrast, more gen-
eral or abstract intentions are thought to rely on the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (Roskies, 2010). In addition, early stages of inten-
tional action have been related to anterior prefrontal brain regions.
Such processing of complex information, only broadly determined
by speciﬁc task demands, is then thought to travel posteriorly to
enter later stages of intentional action (Brass et al., 2013). The sub-
jective experience of volitional agency has been associated with
parietal brain regions (Roskies, 2010). Hence, in line with our
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ﬁndings, general aspects of volitional control and the subjective
experience thereof rely on brain regions that are highly active
during lucid compared to non-lucid dreaming.
CONSCIOUSNESS IN HUMANS AND NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Higher-order aspects of consciousness are traditionally thought
to be most pronounced in humans (Edelman, 2001). In particu-
lar volitional capabilities have been proposed to be a distinctive
human attribute (Dijksterhuis and Aarts, 2010; Frith, 2013). If
the contrast between ordinary and lucid dreaming mirrors that
between basal and higher-order consciousness, data on the neural
correlates of dream lucidity might shed new light on this debate.
Indeed it turns out that cerebral regions showing increased activity
during lucid dreaming also show extensive volumetric expansion
in humans as compared to non-human primates (Van Essen and
Dierker, 2007; see Figure 1). Recently the hypothesis was proposed
that only animals possessing higher-order aspects of consciousness
may develop psychotic states – “in other words an animal needs
to have a highly developed mind in order to go out of it” (Hobson
and Voss, 2011, p. 993). Neuroimaging data on lucid dreaming
support this claim: areas activated during lucid dreaming (Dresler
et al., 2012) do not only mirror human vs. non-human primate
brain differences (Van Essen and Dierker, 2007), but also show
striking overlap with brain areas associated with insight deﬁcits in
psychosis (Dresler et al., in revision).
LIMITATIONS
A couple of limitations have to be kept in mind for the interpre-
tation of our study’s results. First, we used an adapted version
of VCQ that was not speciﬁcally validated for its use in dif-
ferent states of consciousness. This applies in particular to the
overall score combining the six subscales. While the original ver-
sion was created to evaluate time frames of several weeks, for
our adapted version only items were chosen that are applicable
to shorter episodes like dreams. Second, whereas the ratings for
lucid and non-lucid dreaming were collected after awakening from
the respective dream phase in the early morning, the ratings for
wakefulness were collected after a full day of wakefulness in the
evening. Thus, the length of the rated episodes differed, and it
cannot be excluded that chronobiological inﬂuences affected the
ratings. Third, the order of data collection was not randomized,
but started for all subjects with the wakefulness ratings, followed
by the non-lucid dreaming ratings, which were ﬁnally followed by
the lucid dreaming ratings. Thus, order effects might have inﬂu-
enced the results. However, several subjects completed more than
one questionnaire and did so after a complete round of ratings.
Since the scores from these repeated ratings did not differ from
the ﬁrst ratings, it is rather unlikely that rating order affected the
results. Fourth, gender differences for content and recall have been
reported for non-lucid (Schredl et al., 2004) and lucid (Schredl
and Erlacher, 2011) dreams, however our small sample size does
not allow a reliable analysis of possible gender effects on state-
dependent volition. An explorative analysis did not reveal gender
effects (p > 0.2) or gender × state interactions (p > 0.4).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our study conﬁrmed the multifaceted nature of consciousness:
volitional components of higher-order consciousness are differ-
entially expressed among different conscious states. On a coarser
level, the generally wake-like expression of volition during lucid
dreaming is well in line with the neural activity pattern observed
during this state. Up until 15 years ago, using lucid dreaming
for the study of consciousness was not seen as experimentally
advantageous (Crick and Koch, 1998). However, neuroimaging
research into the neural correlates of lucid dreaming and its asso-
ciation with metacognitive and volitional processes has proven
lucid dreaming to be a highly promising approach for the investi-
gation of higher-order aspects of consciousness. Neural correlates
of lucid dreaming show a remarkable overlap with areas and net-
works subserving self-reﬂective thought andvolitional capabilities.
In addition, these areas show the strongest differences between
human and non-human primates, strengthening suggestions that
FIGURE 1 | Brain areas subserving the transition from basal to
higher-order consciousness in REM sleep dreaming mirror those
with strongest volumetric expansion in humans compared to
non-human primates. Left: during lucid dreaming, the dorsolateral
prefrontal and frontopolar cortices, parietal lobules, and inferior/middle
temporal gyri among other cortical regions are strongly activated as
compared with non-lucid REM sleep (republished with permission of the
American Academy of Sleep Medicine, from Dresler et al. (2012);
permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.). Right:
neuroanatomical differences between humans and non-human primates
(Van Essen and Dierker, 2007; reprint with permission of Cell Press).
Color-coded are regional volumetric expansions in the human relative to
the macaque brain, hot colors depict up to a 32-fold volumetric
increase in humans. Right lateral view.
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higher-order aspects of consciousness are most pronounced in
humans.
While research into lucid dreaming is currently hampered by
the rarity of the phenomenon, systematic training (Stumbrys et al.,
2012), and new technical approaches for its induction like tran-
scranial direct current stimulation (tDCS; Noreika et al., 2010;
Stumbrys et al., 2013) might lead to research programs beyond
a collection of case studies. In such research programs, subjects
might be asked to actively engage in metacognitive processes and
volitional acts during lucid dreaming, thereby tracing higher-order
consciousness from its state-dependent absence to the regain-
ing of the ability to engage in higher-order conscious thought
to its actual execution. Using neuroimaging methods in combi-
nation with reﬁned measures of the degree of lucidity, e.g., by
exploiting scales that assess several dimensions of volition and
insight during dreams (Voss et al., 2013), the speciﬁc involvement
of several brain regions in distinct higher-order aspects of con-
sciousness may be disentangled. Such studies would further reﬁne
the neural correlates underlying the multiple facets of human
consciousness.
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